Question 1: What is the primary objective of Law 113(I)/2017 in relation to antitrust damages claims in Cyprus?
Answer: The primary objective of Law 113(I)/2017 is to enable victims of antitrust infringements to obtain full compensation for the harm they have suffered, thereby restoring them to the position they would have been in had the infringement not occurred.
Question 2: Which EU Directive does Law 113(I)/2017 transpose, and what are the main goals of that Directive?
Answer: Law 113(I)/2017 transposes Directive 2014/104/EU. The Directive’s main goals are to ensure effective private enforcement of competition law, to provide common standards for damages claims across the EU, and to prevent overcompensation while allowing victims to recover losses stemming from antitrust infringements.
Question 3: How does the law define “full compensation,” and what components (e.g., actual damage, loss of profit, interest) are included in this concept?
Answer: Full compensation is defined as restoring the injured party to the position they would have occupied in the absence of the infringement. This includes actual (or special) damages, loss of profit, and interest from the time the harm occurred until full payment while expressly excluding punitive damages.
Question 4: What is the limitation period for bringing antitrust damages actions under Law 113(I)/2017, and when does this period begin to run?
Answer: The limitation period under Law 113(I)/2017 is six years. This period begins only after the infringement has ceased and when the claimant knew or could reasonably have been expected to know about the infringement, the harm it caused, and the identity of the infringer.
Question 5: How does Law 113(I)/2017 address the pass-on defense, particularly for indirect purchasers, and what is the burden of proof associated with this defense?
Answer: Law 113(I)/2017 permits a pass-on defense whereby defendants may argue that any overcharge has been passed on to subsequent buyers. In such cases, the claimant bears the burden of proving that the overcharge was passed on and resulted in harm. For indirect purchasers, a rebuttable presumption may arise from evidence at the level of the direct purchaser, although the claimant must ultimately establish the necessary causal link.
Question 6: What provisions exist regarding court-ordered disclosure, and how does the law protect confidential information during such proceedings?
Answer: The law provides for court-ordered disclosure through Articles 5 to 8 of Law 113(I)/2017, which empowers the court to require parties or third parties to disclose relevant evidence. Any disclosure order must be specific and proportionate to the needs of the case, and the court must take measures—such as in-camera reviews and redaction orders—to protect confidential information from unnecessary exposure.
Question 7: Under what circumstances can courts appoint experts to quantify damages, and what is the framework for selecting these experts?
Answer: Courts may appoint experts to assist in quantifying damages when determining harm, overcharge, or lost profits is complex or difficult to calculate. The selection of experts is governed by the general rules of civil procedure, whereby the court exercises its discretion to appoint qualified and impartial professionals with the necessary economic or financial expertise.
Question 8: How is interest on awarded damages calculated under Law 113(I)/2017, including the rate applied and the moment from which interest accrues?
Answer: Interest on awarded damages is calculated on a simple interest basis from the date the harm occurred until full payment is made. The applicable interest rate is the statutory rate as determined by ministerial decrees under the Courts of Justice (Rate of Interest on Judgments) Laws, which is the same rate used for other civil awards.
Question 9: What rules govern the joint and several liability of co-infringers, and how are contribution claims among them regulated?
Answer: Co‑infringers are held jointly and severally liable for the harm caused by the infringement. If one infringer pays damages, that party may seek contributions from the other co-infringers based on their respective levels of responsibility for the harm. The law also imposes limitations on contribution claims, particularly for those parties that have benefited from leniency programs, ensuring that each co‑infringer’s liability reflects their proportional culpability.
Question 10: In the context of collective redress, how does the law accommodate representative actions versus other forms of collective actions?
Answer: There is no dedicated framework for collective redress in Cyprus. Instead, the law allows for the joinder of claims under the general rules of civil procedure. In representative actions, a designated organization may bring a claim on behalf of a group of victims on an ad hoc basis, while collective actions involve two or more claimants joining their claims without a formal representative body. Both types of actions rely on ordinary civil litigation procedures.
Question 11: How does the consensual dispute resolution process affect the limitation period and possible subsequent damages actions under the law?
Answer: Consensual dispute resolution processes, such as mediation, arbitration, or settlement negotiations, have a suspensive effect on the limitation period as provided in Article 17 of Law 113(I)/2017. During the dispute resolution process, the limitation period is suspended. If a settlement is reached, it affects subsequent damages actions by preventing claimants from seeking additional recovery for the same infringement, thereby avoiding double recovery.
Question 12: Are contingency fee arrangements and third-party litigation funding permitted in antitrust damages actions, and what rules or ethical guidelines govern these funding mechanisms?
Answer: Contingency fee arrangements are permitted in Cyprus and are governed by the Cyprus Bar Association’s general rules and ethical guidelines. These guidelines require that such agreements be transparent, fair, and documented in writing. Additionally, third-party litigation funding is allowed under general contractual principles; however, there is no specific statutory regime for litigation funding in antitrust damages actions.
At Trojan Economics, we believe that a robust legal framework and effective private enforcement mechanisms are essential for empowering victims of antitrust infringements to secure full compensation and promote fair competition.
