By its judgment of 29 January 2026 in case C-286/24, Meliá, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) provided an important interpretation of Article 5(1) of Directive 2014/104/EU (the Damages Directive), which regulates the disclosure of evidence in actions for damages arising from infringements of competition law. The ruling is pivotal to the effectiveness of such actions, particularly in situations where injured parties are unable to access evidence exclusively in the infringing undertaking’s possession.
The case originated in an application brought by a Portuguese consumer organisation before the Portuguese courts seeking disclosure of documents held by Meliá Hotels International, in order to assess the possibility of bringing a collective damages action. The application was based on the European Commission’s decision of 21 February 2020 (AT.40528 – Meliá (Holiday Pricing)), which concluded that there was an infringement of Article 101 TFEU through vertical agreements restricting cross-border competition. Following a request for a preliminary ruling from the Supreme Court of Portugal (Supremo Tribunal de Justiça), the CJEU was called upon to clarify whether Article 5(1) of the Directive also applies to disclosure requests made before the filing of a damages action, and to specify the standard of proof required at that stage.
In its judgment, the CJEU held that Article 5(1) must be interpreted broadly to encompass requests for disclosure submitted before a damages action is formally initiated, provided that such a procedural mechanism exists under national law and that the request is functionally linked to a prospective claim for damages. This interpretation reflects the EU legislature’s intention not to exclude preparatory proceedings from the Directive’s scope. According to the Court, a narrower reading would undermine the Directive’s objective of ensuring the effective enforcement of EU competition law, as it would impede injured parties’ access to the evidence necessary to substantiate their claims.
Within this same framework, the Court further clarified the role of European Commission decisions in subsequent damages proceedings. Pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003, national courts are bound by Commission decisions regarding the existence of the infringement, including its nature and scope, from a substantive, personal, temporal, and territorial perspective.
However, the Court emphasised that a Commission decision – even one concerning conduct characterised as a restriction of competition “by object” and adopted under the settlement procedure pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 – does not, by itself, establish liability for damages. A finding of infringement does not automatically entail civil liability. The claimant must also demonstrate the existence of harm and a causal link between the infringement and the alleged damage.
More specifically, the applicant must make it plausible that it suffered actual harm—for example, through higher prices, reduced consumer choice, or exclusion from more favourable offers. At the same time, the applicant must provide a reasoned justification, based on reasonably available evidence, demonstrating a causal link between the competition law infringement and the alleged damage. In other words, the mere existence of an infringement is insufficient. While quantification of the damage is not required at this stage, the material submitted must indicate that the infringement was capable of affecting the applicant’s interests.
A particularly noteworthy aspect of the judgment concerns the level of proof required at the disclosure stage. The CJEU expressly rejected the strict “more likely than not” standard—that is, the balance of probabilities test—as regards proof of the conditions for civil liability, in particular harm and causation.
As the Court clarified, it is sufficient for the claim to appear plausible and to be supported by concrete evidence reasonably available to the applicant. In other words, the national court must assess whether, based on the evidence submitted, it is reasonably arguable that the established infringement could have caused harm and that a causal link exists between the infringement and the alleged damage.
The standard of proof required at the disclosure stage is therefore considerably lower than that required to establish the case in full at trial. At this preliminary stage, it is sufficient to plausibly demonstrate that the applicant suffered harm directly caused by the infringement, ensuring that the exercise of procedural rights is neither practically impossible nor unduly burdensome.
Simultaneously, the judgment confirms that the presumption of harm under Article 17(2) of the Directive applies only to cartel cases, that is, horizontal agreements between competitors, given their typically secretive nature. This rebuttable presumption does not extend to vertical infringements, such as those at issue in Meliá. Accordingly, the applicant must still demonstrate the required degree of plausibility in relation to both harm and causation.
Finally, the CJEU emphasised that disclosure of evidence is subject to the principle of proportionality. National courts must balance the legitimate interests of the parties and third parties, and determine whether the disclosure request is sufficiently specific and necessary to substantiate the claim. The procedure must not be transformed into a vague or generalised search for information—a “fishing expedition”—but should be confined to material genuinely relevant to the alleged harm and its causal connection to the infringement. Appropriate measures must also be adopted to safeguard confidential or commercially sensitive information.
In sum, the CJEU’s judgment in Meliá (C-286/24) highlights three key points. First, a request for access to evidence may be made before the filing of a damages action, provided it is sufficiently linked to a prospective claim. Second, although a Commission infringement decision binds national courts as to the existence of the infringement, it is not, by itself, sufficient to establish civil liability; the applicant must plausibly demonstrate both harm and causation. Third, the plausibility standard at the disclosure stage is considerably lower than that required at the merits stage, yet it is neither automatic nor merely formal.
Overall, the judgment provides important clarification on the injured parties’ right to access evidence prior to bringing a damages action and reinforces the effectiveness of private enforcement of EU competition law, without allowing disclosure to become uncontrolled or disproportionate. At the same time, it offers clear guidance to national courts on balancing the need for disclosure against the protection of undertakings’ rights, thereby reducing information asymmetry and contributing to the development of a more coherent framework for private competition law enforcement within the European Union.
