In a dynamic economy, mergers and acquisitions are part of the normal functioning of the market. Investors seek new opportunities, corporate structures are reorganised, and businesses grow. These developments are not, in themselves, negative. On the contrary, they often show that an economy is active, adapting and expanding.
The question, therefore, is not whether concentrations should be subject to ex ante review by the competition authorities. Such a review is necessary because it allows the competent authority to examine a transaction before it is completed — and before market conditions are created that may be difficult to reverse.
The rationale is clear. A merger or acquisition that reduces the number of strong competitors in a market may limit consumer choice, lead to price increases, or weaken incentives to improve quality and innovation. These are precisely the risks that merger control is designed to identify in good time.
This does not, however, mean that every concentration is problematic. Many transactions may produce positive effects. They may allow businesses to become more efficient, reduce costs, invest more, and offer better products or services. For that reason, merger control should not operate mechanically. It must focus on substance: what actually changes in the market after the transaction.
The data in Cyprus show a clear increase in merger notifications to the Commission for the Protection of Competition. In 2016, 26 notifications were recorded. By 2026, the figure had reached 45. The highest number was recorded in 2021, with 75 cases.
Despite this increase, the practical picture remains stable. The overwhelming majority of notified concentrations are cleared without conditions. Only in an exceptionally limited number of cases is clearance accompanied by conditions or commitments undertaken by the participating undertakings. Likewise, over the past decade, only 9 concentrations proceeded to a full Phase II investigation — that is, they were considered, at a preliminary stage, capable of raising more serious competition concerns and therefore requiring more detailed assessment.
Most cases are concluded during the first phase of review. A significant proportion concerns transactions that do not even give rise to an affected market — namely, transactions where the combined market shares of the participating undertakings remain below the thresholds that normally trigger a more substantive competitive assessment: 15% for horizontal relationships and 25% for vertical relationships.
These figures show that the system works. But they also reveal a second reality: a significant share of notified transactions presents a low risk to competition. Even so, these cases remain subject to the full notification and assessment procedure because the legislation does not currently provide a simplified or fast-track process for transactions that raise no substantive competition concerns.
The cost of this asymmetry is twofold. For businesses, it means time, cost and procedural burden. For the CPC, it means additional administrative and supervisory workload. When a significant part of the review effort is absorbed by low-risk transactions, resources are inevitably diverted from the cases that genuinely warrant closer attention.
This debate is not theoretical. It is particularly timely in light of the proposed amendment to the merger control legislation. Under the proposed framework, the existing aggregate turnover threshold of €3.5 million in the Republic of Cyprus would be removed and replaced by an additional turnover threshold of €200,000 in Cyprus for at least two of the participating undertakings.
This is not a technical detail. It could materially widen the range of transactions subject to mandatory notification, even where the undertakings concerned have only limited substantive economic presence in the Cypriot market.
At the same time, the core monetary threshold has remained essentially unchanged for approximately 25 years. Since then, the Cypriot economy has changed radically. Cyprus joined the European Union. Businesses have grown. Markets have become more complex. Inflation has eroded the real value of monetary thresholds. A threshold that may have made sense for the economy of 2000 does not necessarily fit the economy of 2026.
Revising notification thresholds does not mean weakening merger control. It means better targeting. The objective should not be to bring as many transactions as possible within the notification system. The objective should be to identify, in good time, the transactions that can genuinely affect competition.
A more targeted system benefits everyone. Businesses are not burdened with unnecessary procedures for low-risk transactions, while the CPC can allocate its available resources to the cases where there is a real competitive stake. In this way, the protection of competition is not weakened. It is strengthened.
Merger control is not judged by the number of cases a competition authority examines. It is judged by its ability to distinguish routine transactions from those that materially alter a market’s structure.
The goal, therefore, should not be more notifications. It should be fewer low-risk notifications and a review process focused on the concentrations that raise genuine competition issues.
Dr Panayiotis Agisilaou
Managing Director | Trojan Economics
Stavros Efthymiou
Associate | Trojan Economics
